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The powers and limits of science have been identified consistently as an essential aspect of 6 
science education by the National Research Council of the National Academies, American 7 
Association for the Advancement of Science, and National Science Foundation.  Their 8 
mainstream position is balanced and sensible, but it has not yet been supported with reasons.  9 
A reasoned account of science’s powers and limits must explain and secure the resources 10 
needed to support conclusions about physical objects and events.  The required three 11 
resources are appropriate presuppositions, empirical evidence, and standard logic.  12 
Mainstream science faces competitors that either diminish or else aggrandize science.  13 
Consequently, the scientific merit and future prospects of the mainstream position on the 14 
powers and limits of science could be improved by defending it with reasons based on science’s 15 
resources. 16 
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The powers and limits of science are an essential aspect of science education.  The National 25 
Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies recommends that “Students should develop 26 
an understanding of what science is, what science is not, what science can and cannot do, and 27 
how science contributes to culture” (p 21 in 1).  Likewise, the American Association for the 28 
Advancement of Science (AAAS) identifies this issue as a critical component of science literacy:  29 
“Being liberally educated requires an awareness not only of the power of scientific knowledge 30 
but also of its limitations,” and learning these limitations “should be a goal of all science courses” 31 
(pp 20–21 in 2).  The National Science Foundation (NSF) concurs that “every student should be 32 
presented an opportunity to understand what science is, and is not” (p 2 in 3).  There has been a 33 
sustained call for scientists and nonscientists alike to understand what science can and cannot 34 
do.  This topic of science’s powers and limits entails an account of science’s resources because 35 
they determine what science is or is not able to investigate. 36 
This topic is important because of the social context of science.  “The scientific enterprise 37 
is built on a foundation of trust” (p ix in 4).  In order to merit this trust, an ethical responsibility 38 
for individual scientists and scientific organizations is to neither understate nor overstate the 39 
domain and abilities of science.  The stakes are high because when trust is violated, the 40 
relationship between science and society is undermined (p ix).  Furthermore, “Researchers seek 41 
to answer some of the most fundamental questions that humans can ask about nature,” and 42 
“Their work can have a direct and immediate impact on the lives of people throughout the world” 43 
(p 1).  Consequently, important intellectual, ethical, and pragmatic motivations energize the call 44 
for scientists and others to understand the powers and limits of science.  However, there are two 45 
serious problems. 46 
 First and most obviously, the mainstream vision of science’s powers and limits, which 47 
these position papers present, is hotly contested.  Prominent cultural influences of relativism, 48 
skepticism, cynicism, and postmodernism diminish science, whereas the opposite influence of 49 
scientism aggrandizes science.  One might wonder how this controversy impacts scientists, and 50 
how well scientists can articulate their own positions.  For instance, for almost two decades I 51 
have taught a course on scientific method for undergraduate and graduate students, which 52 
includes the powers and limits of science.  Few students can give a tolerable account of science’s 53 
powers and limits, and virtually none can give principled reasons for their own views—and give 54 
good arguments against other views.  Evidently, the commendable vision of a widely understood 55 
and accurate boundary around science’s proper domain is not yet a reality. 56 
 Second, none of the position papers cited here defend their positions on science’s powers 57 
and limits with reasons.  This lack of reasoning is curious because the NRC calls for “scientific 58 
knowledge with understanding” or reasoning (p 21 in 1).  It also warns against a “rather flat 59 
‘rhetoric of conclusions’” (p 111 in 5), that is, against giving conclusions without supporting 60 
reasons.  A fundamental question is:  What resources or premises are required to reach 61 
conclusions about physical objects and events?  In other words, what information goes in so that 62 
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scientific conclusions can come out?  The answer might seem obvious and trivial:  Evidence 63 
supports conclusions.  Indeed, that answer has been promulgated in recent years by popular 64 
rhetoric about evidence-based science.  However, scientific reasoning is actually more complex, 65 
as even a very simple example reveals.  Envision a toss of an ordinary fair coin and ask, “Did the 66 
coin land heads or tails?”  There are two hypotheses:  “The coin landed heads” and “The coin 67 
landed tails.”  (Rare but possible outcomes like landing on the coin’s edge can be excluded by 68 
specifying in advance that in such cases the coin be tossed again until it lands either heads or 69 
tails.)  Suppose that we look and see tails.  That evidence can be used in an argument with one 70 
premise that “We see tails” and the conclusion that “The coin landed tails.”  That informal 71 
argument might seem satisfactory, but actually it is incomplete.  The logical problem is that the 72 
premise is about an observation, namely what we see, whereas the conclusion is about 73 
something else, an object, namely a coin, so the conclusion does not follow from the premise.  As 74 
explained later, full disclosure of all premises requires the addition of two more premises in order 75 
to connect observation and object, and thereby to reach the conclusion.  A satisfactory account 76 
of science’s powers and limits depends critically on disclosing and securing all premises needed 77 
to reach conclusions, not just the evidence. 78 
Frequent citation in this article of position papers on science from leading scientific 79 
organizations merits explanation because many scientists are unaware of them—although 80 
scientists are quite familiar with Science published by the AAAS and Proceedings of the National 81 
Academy of Sciences (PNAS) published by the National Academy of Sciences.  Given the complex 82 
backdrop of conflicting and competing views on the powers and limits of science, position papers 83 
from the NRC, AAAS, and NSF describe and distinguish one particular position as being the 84 
mainstream position.  The mainstream position on the powers and limits of science has great 85 
merit and balance, but it could be improved substantially by being presented and reinforced with 86 
reasons based on science’s resources.   87 
 88 
Probing Questions 89 
Some advice from the NRC is particularly pertinent for the topic of science’s resources, powers, 90 
and limits:  “Ask probing questions that seek to identify the premises of an argument” (p 55 in 6).  91 
Naturally, the chief feature at the core of science’s problem-solving abilities is “the attitude that 92 
data and evidence hold a primary position in deciding any issue” (p 27 in 5) and “Scientific 93 
knowledge is based on empirical evidence” (p 98 in 7).  Although emphasis on evidence is 94 
appropriate for routine scientific work, examination of science’s powers and limits involves a 95 
special kind of thinking, “Metacognition or ‘thought about thought’,” including “reflecting on the 96 
structure of one’s knowledge and thinking” (p 111 in 5).  If science is to be regarded as a rational 97 
activity with adequate resources to investigate the physical world, then several questions must 98 
be asked and answered.  The first restates a fundamental question raised in the Introduction, 99 
and the next three are follow-up questions. 100 
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 101 
1. What are the requirements for full disclosure of all premises needed to 102 
support any scientific conclusion? 103 
2. How can science’s presuppositions be legitimated, even if they cannot be 104 
proved? 105 
3. What renders evidence admissible and relevant? 106 
4. What does science talk about, and how are those referents specified? 107 
 108 
After these questions been answered satisfactorily, further questions can be asked about 109 
three competing assessments of science. 110 
 111 
5. How can the mainstream position on science’s powers and limits be supported 112 
with reasons? 113 
6. What response can mainstream science give to diminished science? 114 
7. What response can mainstream science give to aggrandized science? 115 
 116 
The above questions are pertinent throughout all of the physical, biological, and social 117 
sciences.  The following seven sections address these questions. 118 
 119 
The PEL Model of Full Disclosure 120 
What are the requirements for full disclosure of all premises needed to support any scientific 121 
conclusion?  Historical perspective shows that this question has not been as easy to answer as 122 
one might suppose (pp 34–52 in 8).  Around 300 BC, Aristotle raised this question.  But there was 123 
an unresolved tension between his ideal science of geometry that featured deduction of 124 
theorems from axioms, and his actual science that required observations of animals and stars 125 
and other objects.  A millennium and a half passed by until around 1300 when medieval 126 
luminaries—particularly Albertus Magnus, Robert Grosseteste, and William of Ockham—had first 127 
crafted a satisfactory answer.  One of their revolutionary ideas was that knowledge of real 128 
physical entities (scientia realis) could not proceed by the same methods as knowledge of 129 
abstract logical entities (scientia rationalis), so science finally stopped trying to emulate 130 
geometry.  Their intact and viable account of scientific thinking remains a magnificent intellectual 131 
achievement, especially because their aim was a decidedly human-sized account of science that 132 
explicitly considered the capabilities of human endowments.  But unfortunately, during the past 133 
century, an understanding of all the resources required to support scientific conclusions has all 134 
but totally disappeared from the science curriculum. 135 
 As already explained in the Introduction, the informal argument from the single premise 136 
about the evidence that “We see tails” to the conclusion that “The coin landed tails” is actually 137 
incomplete.  Symbolize we see tails by “St” and the coin landed tails by “Ct.”  Then the informal 138 
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argument has the form “St; therefore Ct,” which is a non sequitur.  What is missing?  Another 139 
requirement is the premise that “We see tails implies the coin landed tails,” or symbolically “St 140 
implies Ct,” which links human observation and physical object.  This premise is the 141 
commonsense presupposition that seeing is believing, which includes that the physical world 142 
exists, our sense perceptions are generally reliable, and human language suffices for discussing 143 
such matters.  With the addition of these presuppositions by the second premise, the argument 144 
becomes “St; St implies Ct; therefore Ct,” which now follows the valid argument form modus 145 
ponens. 146 
 By definition, the presuppositions of a question or hypothesis set are propositions that 147 
must be true in order for all hypotheses to be either true or false.  “A presupposition of a question 148 
is a thesis (or proposition) that is inherent in (and thus entailed by) each of its possible fully 149 
explicit answers” (p 5 in 9).  For instance, in order for the hypotheses “The coin landed heads” 150 
and “The coin landed tails” to each have a truth value of either true or false, it must be the case 151 
that “The coin exists.”  Hence, the proposition “The coin exists” is a presupposition of the 152 
question “Did the coin land heads or tails?”  The background experience and knowledge that we 153 
bring to our ordinary, everyday questions enables these questions to be focused and limited in 154 
scope.  The question “Did the coin land heads or tails?” does question the coin’s orientation and 155 
does not question the coin’s existence.  “The presuppositions of our questions reflect their 156 
precommitments:  they constitute the formative background that we bring to the very posing of 157 
questions, rather than merely being something we take away as a result of answering them” (p 158 
6).  Indeed, “To pose or otherwise endorse a question is to undertake an at least tacit 159 
commitment to all of its presuppositions” (p 6). 160 
Resuming the coin example, the argument has two premises so far, providing evidence 161 
and presuppositions.  But it is still incomplete.  To achieve full disclosure, the logic used here 162 
must also be disclosed by a third premise declaring that “Modus ponens is a valid argument 163 
form.”  Logic is needed to combine information in the premises “St” and “St implies Ct,” and 164 
thereby to reach the conclusion “Ct.”  (Of course, the other possibility would be that we see heads 165 
Sh and the coin landed heads Ch.)  Although rudimentary deductive logic suffices for this simple 166 
example, scientists utilize deductive logic (including modus ponens), inductive logic (including 167 
statistics), and many branches of mathematics (pp 112–173 in 8).  The complete argument has 168 
three premises and achieves full disclosure. 169 
 170 
 Simple Example of Full Disclosure: 171 
Premise 1, Evidence.  We see tails. 172 
Premise 2, Presupposition. We see tails implies the coin landed tails. 173 
Premise 3, Logic.  Modus ponens is a valid argument form. 174 
Conclusion.   The coin landed tails. 175 
 176 
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 This example illustrates the general principle that every conclusion about the physical 177 
world requires premises of three kinds:  presuppositions, evidence, and logic.  This is the PEL 178 
model of full disclosure, named for its three components (pp 124–131 in 10; pp 78–84 in 8).  The 179 
PEL model has an intellectual heritage from the ex suppositione reasoning of Aristotle, the 180 
conditional necessity of Albertus Magnus, the scientia realis of William of Ockham, the four rules 181 
of reasoning of Sir Isaac Newton, and the symmetry thesis of Thomas Reid (pp 41, 46, 74–76, and 182 
176–177 in 8).  The evidence concerns a human perception, whereas the hypotheses and 183 
conclusion concern something else, an external physical object; accordingly, presuppositions and 184 
logic provide the required link between perceptions and objects.  The AAAS brings together the 185 
three resources of the PEL model as a basis for scientific conclusions in a suggestive remark about 186 
“the principles of logical reasoning that connect evidence and assumptions with conclusions,” 187 
where “assumptions” may be taken as a synonym for presuppositions (p 27 in 11). 188 
 189 
Legitimated Presuppositions 190 
How can science’s presuppositions be legitimated, even if they cannot be proved?  The 191 
presuppositions of science cannot be proved or disproved by the ordinary means of marshaling 192 
evidence because any appeal to evidence has already implicated these presuppositions.  Instead, 193 
presuppositions can be legitimated by basing them on our most confident and widespread 194 
knowledge about ourselves and our world.  The NRC states that “Inquiry requires identification 195 
of assumptions” (p 23 in 1).  Accordingly, position papers on science often identify science’s 196 
presuppositions, such as “Science assumes that objects and events in natural systems occur in 197 
consistent patterns that are understandable through measurement and observation” (p 100 in 198 
7).  Likewise, “Science presumes that the things and events in the universe occur in consistent 199 
patterns that are comprehensible through careful, systematic study” (p 25 in 11; also see p 16 in 200 
2).  However, no reasons to accept these specific assumptions or presuppositions—and no 201 
reasons to reject contrary presuppositions—have been given in any position papers that have yet 202 
come to my attention. 203 
The entire scientific enterprise needs to disclose and legitimate its presuppositions but 204 
once, whereas each scientific project requires its own particular collection of evidence.  205 
Legitimation does not involve learning new and erudite material; rather, it is an exercise in 206 
becoming self-aware of our own ongoing experiences and beliefs (pp 84–89 in 8).  A key insight 207 
is that the presuppositions underlying the generation of facts “are not known to us or believed 208 
by us before we start establishing facts, but are recognized on the contrary by reflecting on the 209 
way we establish facts” (p 162 in 12).  Accordingly, there are two steps to legitimate 210 
presuppositions:  Identify some widely-believed and well-established facts, and then reflect on 211 
them in order to recognize what we have been presupposing all along about ourselves and our 212 
world. 213 
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The first step is selection of some commonsense knowledge about the world that is as 214 
unquestioned and widely known as is anything that could be mentioned.  Common sense is the 215 
realm of our easiest knowledge—indeed, much of it is known by children only three or four years 216 
old.  There are many good reasons for starting the journey of human knowledge with common 217 
sense (13).  Significantly, the NRC gives science a grounding in, and continuity with, the interests 218 
and capabilities of children:  “The research of the past few decades has thus revealed greater 219 
similarities between the concepts of children and those of scientists, avoiding simplistic 220 
dichotomies in which the concepts of the two are seen to be fundamentally different types” (p 221 
106 in 5; also see pp 24–25 in 6).  Any simple example of commonsense facts about the world 222 
would serve equally well, such as “Here is a glass of water” or “There are elephants in Africa.”  223 
But for the sake of concreteness, the following reality check serves as an exemplar of unassailable 224 
knowledge that is comfortably within reach of ordinary human endowments and experiences:  225 
Stepping in front of rapidly moving cars is hazardous for pedestrians. 226 
 The second step to legitimate presuppositions is philosophical reflection on the reality 227 
check in order to disclose our presuppositions and to show that they also suffice for science.  In 228 
order for the reality check to have been established by our experiences of life, the general 229 
makeup of the world cannot follow just any conceivable story.  In agreement with the quotations 230 
from the NRC and AAAS in this section’s first paragraph, the following statement offers a concise 231 
expression of these basic presuppositions:  The physical world is real and orderly and we humans 232 
find it substantially comprehensible. 233 
 Further reflection on the reality check reveals three obvious and yet remarkable things 234 
about our world and ourselves.  First, physical objects have properties and causal powers.  For 235 
instance, impact from rapidly moving cars can cause harm or death for pedestrians because cars 236 
have the properties of being heavy and hard relative to humans.  Indeed, “A major activity of 237 
science is investigating and explaining causal relationships and the mechanisms by which they 238 
are mediated” (p 79 in 7; also see 14).  Second, reflection also reveals that humans desire to know 239 
and understand.  Naturally, we need to know the reality check, and need to teach it to young 240 
children in the form “Look both ways before crossing a street,” for its sheer survival value.  But 241 
humans desire more than mere survival.  Rather, “it is a remarkable fact about us that we cannot 242 
simply observe phenomena:  we want to know why they occur” (p 3 in 15).  For instance, we 243 
know the reality check not merely as a regularity, that being hit by a car is bad over and over 244 
again; but rather, we also understand and explain the reality check in terms of properties of 245 
objects and causes of events.  Third, science has public status because of our shared human 246 
nature encountering our shared physical world, and that includes all humans having soft and 247 
vulnerable bodies relative to hard and rapidly moving cars.  “In all cultures, whether they are 248 
highly technological or profoundly traditional, there are natural systems that everyone 249 
encounters in common and must explain;” for instance, everyone knows that “bounded solid 250 
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objects, such as rubber balls, wooden doors, and rigid sticks … cannot move through each other” 251 
(p 56 in 5). 252 
 Science requires more experimentation, more data collection, more computation, more 253 
thought, and more work than common sense, but requires no further presuppositions.  Indeed, 254 
any extraneous presuppositions would restrict science because whatever is presupposed cannot 255 
also be concluded.  For instance, science can investigate the electric charge of electrons because 256 
science does not have any presuppositions about electrons.  Science’s ability to investigate so 257 
much emerges from its presupposing so little. 258 
 259 
Admissible and Relevant Evidence 260 
What renders evidence admissible and relevant?  First, evidence is rendered admissible by 261 
presuppositions.  Given commonsense presuppositions about the existence of physical objects 262 
and the sensory and mental endowments of humans, a report about seeing a coin is admissible.  263 
By contrast, different presuppositions, such as that the world is an illusion, would make 264 
observations of a coin or anything else inadmissible, thereby incapacitating science.  Second, 265 
evidence should be relevant relative to the competing hypotheses, bearing differentially on their 266 
credibilities.  For example, the hypotheses regarding the outcome of a coin toss disagree about 267 
what will be observed.  Consequently, seeing that the coin landed tails is relevant because it 268 
confirms one hypothesis and disconfirms the other. 269 
Presuppositions must be understood in order to elucidate the concept of evidence 270 
because admissibility inherently involves presuppositions.  Presuppositions suitable for science 271 
are nondiscriminatory and indispensable.  First, nondiscriminatory means having no positive or 272 
negative bearing on the credibility of any of the competing hypotheses.  Appropriate 273 
presuppositions are nondiscriminatory precisely because they are shared in common among all 274 
of the hypotheses under consideration, in accord with the definition of a presupposition.  For 275 
example, the hypotheses about the coin landing heads or else tails agree and presuppose that a 276 
physical object such as the coin is real and that humans can observe and discuss a coin toss.  277 
Second, as the PEL model explains, presuppositions are indispensable because there must be a 278 
link between perception and object in order to assert any of the hypotheses as the argument’s 279 
conclusion.  Likewise, logic is nondiscriminatory because it gives neither hypothesis about the 280 
coin any advantage or disadvantage, and yet it is indispensable for reaching any conclusion. 281 
 The three components of the PEL model—presuppositions, evidence, and logic—are 282 
complementary.  Presuppositions and logic answer the question:  How can we assert any of the 283 
hypotheses?  Evidence answers the question:  How can we assert a specific hypothesis rather 284 
than any of the others?  Both questions must be answered.  The role of evidence is to discriminate 285 
among the competing hypotheses in order to assert a specific one as the conclusion; but that role 286 
is inoperative without the support of logic and presuppositions that make it possible to assert 287 
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any conclusion.  Any discussion or defense of science’s rationality that ignores presuppositions is 288 
provably incomplete and necessarily inadequate. 289 
 290 
Specified Referents 291 
What does science talk about, and how are those referents specified?  That seemingly simple 292 
question is surprisingly complex and controversial.  The character or nature of scientific 293 
knowledge can be approached in a concrete manner by considering typical knowledge claims in 294 
scientific journals.  For instance, a recent issue of PNAS has information on decadal trends in the 295 
ocean carbon sink, the bacterial flagellar motor, germline chromosomes in songbirds, and 296 
targeted immune therapy to combat cancer.  Obviously, physical objects and events are what 297 
that literature is about:  oceans, bacteria, chromosomes, birds, humans, and cancer are typical 298 
referents of scientific literature.  Equally obviously, science is done by humans, so scientific 299 
articles express human ideas and knowledge claims by means of words and images.  Hence, 300 
science has a dual context of physical objects and human beliefs.  Significantly, our most 301 
rudimentary knowledge has the same dual context:  The reality check’s referents are physical 302 
objects, namely moving cars and human pedestrians; and human endowments are presumed and 303 
displayed by our having acquired and communicated the knowledge expressed in its text.  304 
Accordingly, scientific literature resonates with the basic presuppositions recommended here 305 
that “The physical world is real and orderly and we humans find it substantially comprehensible.” 306 
Furthermore, given the dual context of physical objects and human beliefs, the 307 
correspondence theory of truth is applicable and meaningful:  A statement is true if it 308 
corresponds with reality, but is false if it does not.  For instance, the statement that “targeted 309 
immunotherapy may provide more durable remissions” than “tyrosine kinase inhibitors in 310 
treating cancer” is true if and only if that is the case for these physical objects and events, namely 311 
cancers, tyrosine phosphorylation inhibitors, and immunotherapy (16).  The truth of this claim 312 
matters:  It has practical consequences for mitigation of serious human diseases.  Consequently, 313 
ordinary beliefs about a real, external, and mind-independent physical world that is accessible to 314 
human observation and comprehension—which is expressed in the recommended basic 315 
presuppositions—comports with typical science.  This view is called scientific realism.  It is 316 
sensible and prevalent, but not uncontested. 317 
 Imagine that the contemporaries George Berkeley, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and 318 
Thomas Reid were together and they tossed a coin to decide between two pubs for having lunch 319 
(pp 36–37, 42–49, 74–78, and 93 in 8).  All four would report the same experience of a coin, but 320 
their interpretations of that experience would differ.  Berkeley would say that the coin does not 321 
exist as a mind-independent physical object, but only as a mind-dependent idea of a coin.  Hume 322 
would say that science should concern our experiences or perceptions of the coin, whereas 323 
science cannot and need not know whether the coin exists.  Kant would say that we know about 324 
the coin and phenomenal world as it appears to us, but not about the noumenal world as it 325 
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actually is in itself.  Reid would say that philosophy and science should follow common sense with 326 
a confident and cheerful certainty that the physical coin does exist.  Likewise, imagine stepping 327 
two millennia further back and seeing Plato and his student Aristotle purchasing their lunch with 328 
a coin.  For Plato, the coin would be but an illusory and fleeting shadow of its inaccessible but 329 
thoroughly real Form.  But, for Aristotle, the coin itself would be completely real. 330 
Unlike typical scientific debates about the evidence, this ancient and still ongoing debate 331 
is entirely about something else, namely the presuppositions concerning what is real and 332 
knowable.  Despite their philosophical differences, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Reid, Plato, and 333 
Aristotle could all agree that “The coin landed tails.”  There is agreement about the perceptions 334 
or appearances, although not about the referents and causes behind these sensory perceptions.  335 
The philosophical terms for what these otherwise diverse perspectives have in common is that 336 
they are “empirically equivalent,” or they “save the appearances.”  Accordingly, willingness to 337 
assert that “The coin landed tails” is a true observation, with no deeper commitment to some 338 
metaphysics of coins, could be considered sufficient for science.  Nevertheless, much can be said 339 
in favor of ordinary, commonsense, garden-variety realism.  Anything else seems odd.  For 340 
example, imagine reading an article by an idealist following Berkeley that began,  “To be clear, 341 
by ‘birds’ I do not mean physical animals that eat physical food and breathe physical air, but 342 
rather I mean our ideas that we call ‘birds’ since only minds and ideas exist.”  Or imagine that an 343 
empiricist or skeptic following Hume wrote, “This article concerns human perceptions of oceans, 344 
but only perceptions and not physical objects.” 345 
 The objection could be raised that much contemporary science is extremely weird and 346 
bizarre, so that tame examples of birds and oceans bias this discussion in favor of realism.  347 
Instead, if wilder examples were taken from quantum mechanics, cosmology, and relativity, then 348 
realism would seem misleading or simplistic.  For instance, seemingly solid objects are actually 349 
mostly empty space.  Perhaps our “common sense” works against, rather than for, our ability to 350 
see things as they really are, so the commonsense basic presuppositions are defective.  Granted, 351 
science has given us many surprises relative to commonsense expectations.  However, those 352 
surprises are conclusions of science, not presuppositions.  Indeed, “Although through our 353 
theories, and the instrument-aided observations they lead to, we can go beyond and correct 354 
some of the pre-theoretical picture of the world we have by virtue of our being human, there is 355 
always going to be a sense in which all our knowledge and theory is based on elements in that 356 
picture” (p 95 in 17).  Likewise, “We naturally and correctly expect observationally more remote 357 
theories to make some contact with the world of everyday experience, even if only at the level 358 
of registering meter-stick readings and traces on screens” (p 96).  The supposed erosion of 359 
common sense by bizarre discoveries should not be overstated:  Scientific knowledge of 360 
interactions between neighboring atoms in the solid state only confirms, rather than contradicts, 361 
that cars are solid objects when probed by macroscopic objects such as fingers, which is what 362 
common sense talks about.  For these reasons, the surprising conclusions of science provide no 363 
11 
 
basis for inferring that the presuppositions of science need to be different from those of common 364 
sense. 365 
Scientific realism, which is rooted in science’s basic presuppositions, provides the ideal 366 
context for science to operate with vigor and confidence.  Significantly, if electrons and soybeans 367 
truly are real physical objects with properties such as a negative electric charge and protein-rich 368 
seeds, then these physical referents endow scientific realism with otherwise unapproachable 369 
explanatory depth and power. 370 
 371 
Mainstream Science 372 
The mainstream perspective on science can be expressed with beautiful simplicity, “science is 373 
the art of interrogating nature” (p 17 in 2).  Given that project, position papers on science set 374 
forth an ambitious and sophisticated vision for what counts as success.  Success criteria include 375 
accurate observation and description, predictive accuracy, parsimony or simplicity, testability, 376 
explanation of causes and events, unification of diverse phenomena, coherence with other well-377 
established knowledge, and fruitfulness in generating new questions and further investigations.  378 
For instance, “The idea of cause and effect is fundamental to science—indeed, to making sense 379 
of existence” (p xiii).  Science also contributes to technology, and thereby advances agriculture, 380 
engineering, and medicine.  More generally, “Science is one of the liberal arts … unquestionably,” 381 
and “The lifelong quest for knowledge of self and nature is the ultimate goal of liberal education,” 382 
including the quest “to seek meaning in life” and to achieve a “unity of knowledge” (pp xi, 12, 383 
and 21).  In that quest for meaningful life, the sciences are neither superior to, nor isolated from, 384 
the humanities; but rather, the sciences and the humanities are complementary and synergistic.  385 
Indeed, many of the “fundamental values and aspects [of science] are also the province of the 386 
humanities,” so instruction in science “should include relevant relationships to the humanities” 387 
and science should be “integrated adequately into the totality of human experience” (pp xii, xv, 388 
and xi).  The NRC states that “Scientific findings are limited to what can be answered with 389 
empirical evidence,” so “Not all questions can be answered by science” and “there are other ways 390 
of knowing” (p 100 in 7). 391 
 It was noted earlier that science is public.  But exactly what renders knowledge public?  392 
The PEL model can be used to frame this question in a comparative manner:  What other 393 
knowledge is just as public as is elementary knowledge of the outcome of a coin toss, which was 394 
envisioned to illustrate the PEL model?  Three conditions must be met in order for other 395 
knowledge to be just as public as this coin exemplar (pp 91–93 in 8).  First, that other knowledge 396 
implicates the same presuppositions as the reality check and coin example.  Second, the evidence 397 
is empirical and is available in principle to all interested persons by virtue of ordinary human 398 
endowments of reason and sense perception, like the widespread capability of humans to 399 
observe and know the outcome of a coin toss.  Third, the argument’s logic is as nondiscriminatory 400 
and unbiased toward its competing hypotheses as is the application of modus ponens in the coin 401 
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example.  As discussed in the preceding section on specified referents, not everyone accepts even 402 
rudimentary knowledge claims about coin tosses because radical skeptics reject them, 403 
empiricists restrict knowledge to sensory experience, and idealists deny that mind-independent 404 
physical objects exist.  Nevertheless, an outcome such as “The coin landed tails,” construed in an 405 
ordinary and commonsensical manner, would count as knowledge for so many persons that it 406 
stands as an exemplar of public knowledge—not public in the absolute sense of satisfying every 407 
last one of this world’s several billion persons, but rather public in the practical sense of satisfying 408 
an extraordinarily wide audience of nearly everyone.  When this notion of public knowledge is 409 
applied to scientific or other academic knowledge, the evidence and logic can be so technical that 410 
only experts can understand it.  Hence, much scientific knowledge is not public in the broad sense 411 
that it is as easy for everyone to understand as is the outcome of a coin toss, but rather public in 412 
the relevant sense that unproblematic presuppositions, empirical and public evidence, and 413 
unbiased logic are credentials of knowledge claims that merit serious consideration by the 414 
scientific community. Of course, there are some exceptions to the general rule that science is 415 
publicly available because of national security, trade secrets, pending publication, and other 416 
considerations.  The PEL model’s account of public knowledge illuminates the public status of 417 
science.  Indeed, “Men and women of all ethnic and national backgrounds participate in science 418 
and its applications” (pp 28–29 in 11). 419 
Importantly, the mainstream perspective acknowledges that scientific conclusions range 420 
in reliability from certain to quite speculative.  “In reality, practicing scientists employ a broad 421 
spectrum of methods, and although science involves many areas of uncertainty as knowledge is 422 
developed, there are now many aspects of scientific knowledge that are so well established as to 423 
be unquestioned foundations of the culture and its technologies.  It is only through engagement 424 
in the practices that students can recognize how such knowledge comes about and why some 425 
parts of scientific theory are more firmly established than others” (p 44 in 6).  Accordingly, “The 426 
certainty and durability of scientific findings vary” (p 99 in 7).  Some science is “unquestioned and 427 
uncontested, such as the existence of atoms” (p 79 in 6).  This mainstream position is 428 
unproblematic and sensible because the same situation of varying confidence also occurs in 429 
common sense, history, and human knowledge in general.  Nevertheless, compared to 430 
mainstream science, other positions either diminish or else aggrandize science. 431 
 432 
Diminished Science 433 
Some voices call for scientists to promise less and for the public to expect less—much less.  They 434 
want diminished science, with few or no claims of rationality, realism, objectivity, and truth.  435 
Contrary to mainstream science’s diverse verdicts on the reliability of individual scientific claims, 436 
these critics propose a single universal verdict that all science is suspect, tentative, and revisable.  437 
Some philosophical attacks target all human knowledge, so they impact science even though they 438 
originate outside science (18).  In response, if the doubt is extensive but does not reject the reality 439 
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check, then one can ask the limited skeptic for a coherent account of why the reality check is not 440 
in trouble, but science is.  On the other hand, if the doubt is pervasive and rejects even the reality 441 
check, then one can ask the radical skeptic whether obeying the reality check with one’s feet in 442 
order to survive is compatible with doubting the reality check with one’s mind. 443 
Other attacks originate within science itself.  Eliminative materialism is motivated and 444 
shaped by a particular interpretation of contemporary science.  It claims that physical objects 445 
such as atoms and neurons are real, whereas human rationality, consciousness, and personhood 446 
are illusory and nonexistent (pp 202–210 in 17).  But this variant of materialism places itself in 447 
the peculiar position of proclaiming arguments that are made by illusory persons who have 448 
illusory rationality, and are directed to other illusory persons who have illusory consciousness.  449 
More generally, any philosophical or scientific position that denies human rationality and 450 
consciousness needs to answer a charge of incoherence.  To assert the reality check, or to know 451 
whether a coin landed heads or else tails, in a confident, nonnegotiable, and unassailable manner 452 
might seem like a small step.  Nevertheless, for anyone possessing that confidence, radical 453 
skepticism and eliminative materialism are nonstarters—whether or not one locates the exact 454 
spots where long arguments for those views go awry. 455 
Still other attacks come from some commentators on science who are rather well known 456 
to scientists.  Much of what they say about science is insightful and helpful.  But other elements, 457 
and even themes, of their thinking radically undermine science—or at least science according to 458 
the mainstream vision of the NRC, AAAS, and NSF.  For instance, in an interview in Scientific 459 
American, Sir Karl Popper regards science as “a rational pursuit of the truth” and agrees that “a 460 
theory can be true;” and yet he adamantly denies that “we can ever know it is true” because 461 
scientific claims can only be proven false, but never proven true (19).  In another interview, his 462 
student Paul Feyerabend insists on the “unknowability of reality” for “this one-day fly, a human 463 
being, this little bit of nothing,” and he mocks pretentions of “searching for the truth” (20).  And 464 
Thomas Kuhn says that “he is in fact pro-science;” and yet he describes science as being 465 
“arational,” and he holds that “The real world is unknowable” (21).  In such an intellectual 466 
climate, in which an arational science finds truth unattainable and the real world unknowable, 467 
science is far removed from its ordinary image.  Understandably, some scientists who hold a 468 
mainstream position on science are alarmed by such views, as shown by a commentary in Nature 469 
and its subsequent correspondence (22; also see 23). 470 
 Scientist’s perceptions of what philosophers say about knowledge and science affect the 471 
scientific community’s perspective on science and its referents.  Although some philosophers 472 
have exotic views that are potentially disturbing, such views are not as common as many 473 
scientists might fear.  Actually, most philosophers’ beliefs are congenial to science’s basic 474 
presuppositions and scientific realism.  Recently the first extensive survey of philosophy faculty 475 
was conducted, which obtained 931 responses (24).  Regarding the existence of an external 476 
world, 81.6% of philosophers held non-skeptical realism, 4.8% skepticism, 4.3% idealism, and 477 
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9.2% other.  Regarding science more specifically, 75.1% of philosophers held scientific realism, 478 
11.6% scientific anti-realism, and 13.3% other.  Consequently, scientists who are inclined toward 479 
scientific realism should realize that most philosophers agree with them, and they should not feel 480 
that the most sophisticated view of science is automatically deeply skeptical or hostile. 481 
 Many scientists are reticent to claim that any scientific findings are true or certain.  482 
Admittedly, some position papers express this view that “Scientific knowledge” without 483 
qualification “is tentative, approximate, and subject to revision” (p 20 in 2; also see pp 21 and 24 484 
in 2 and p 26 in 11).  Yet curiously, these same position papers also catalog literally hundreds of 485 
settled facts about the universe, the earth, cells, microbes, heredity, society, agriculture, 486 
manufacturing, communications, and other matters that are decidedly not tentative and not 487 
revisable.  Hence, a charitable reading of these documents perceives the overall message to be 488 
that scientific findings are variously established, ranging from quite tentative to certainly true, in 489 
line with the mainstream position in the previous section.  Fortunately, some other position 490 
papers present a clear and balanced perspective.  The NRC challenges exaggerated accounts of 491 
scientific revolutions:  “Einstein’s general theory of relativity was a true scientific revolution” that 492 
“redefined conceptions of the nature of space and time,” and yet “it did not invalidate all that 493 
had gone before; instead it showed clearly both the limitations of the previous theory and the 494 
domain in which the previous theory is valid as an excellent (close) approximation” (p 33 in 5).  495 
The lesson drawn from this example is that well-tested and established theories “are tentative in 496 
domains in which they have not yet been tested, or in which only limited data are available,” 497 
whereas they “are far from tentative in the domains in which they have repeatedly been tested” 498 
(p 33).  Currently, there are unresolved issues related to the theory of general relativity because 499 
a consistent union with quantum field theory that is free of renormalization troubles is still 500 
elusive.  But just like the previous transition from Newton to Einstein, future refinement would 501 
not invalidate contemporary physics wholesale.  The NRC explicitly rejects the “mistaken 502 
impression” that “uncertainty is a universal attribute of science” (p 44 in 6). 503 
 504 
Aggrandized Science 505 
Some scientists and scholars propose that science is the sole provider of real knowledge that 506 
counts in public discourse, which is a posture called scientism.  A chapter “In Defense of 507 
Scientism” by authors who “admire science to the point of frank scientism” provides a helpful 508 
introduction to this position (p 61 in 25).  The basic contention is that “With respect to anything 509 
that is a putative fact about the world, scientific institutional processes are absolutely and 510 
exclusively authoritative,” and “science respects no domain restrictions and will admit no 511 
epistemological rivals (such as natural theology or purely speculative metaphysics)” (p 28).  512 
Indeed, when we encounter questions that science cannot answer, “This does not imply that we 513 
should look to an institution other than science to answer such questions; we should in these 514 
cases forget about the questions” (p 30).  Their overall objective is “to defend a radically 515 
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naturalistic metaphysics” such that “our philosophy of science and our scientistic metaphysics 516 
reciprocally support each other” (pp 1 and 65); that is, they intend to connect science and 517 
naturalism inseparably.  Likewise, “no alternative kind of metaphysics can be regarded as a 518 
legitimate part of our collective attempt to model the structure of objective reality,” so scientism 519 
insists that naturalism uniquely befits our collective or public knowledge of reality (p 1). 520 
 By contrast, position papers from major scientific organizations, as already quoted, 521 
respect relevant relationships with the humanities, encourage integration of the sciences into 522 
the totality of human experience, and acknowledge ways of knowing besides science.  These 523 
commitments entail a rejection of scientism, even though these position papers do not engage 524 
and refute scientism directly.  But cogent scientific and philosophical arguments against scientism 525 
and its variants can be found elsewhere (26–28).  As scientists consider the literature for and 526 
against scientism, awareness of the PEL model may clarify some underlying issues. 527 
 Scientism claims, as noted above, that scientific institutional processes are the exclusive 528 
providers of legitimate knowledge.  By contrast, the PEL model is developed in the commonsense 529 
context of coins being tossed and pedestrians avoiding car accidents, so there is nothing 530 
distinctively scientific about it.  Indeed, philosophy in particular and the humanities in general 531 
also generate some knowledge claims by appeal to empirical and public evidence in accord with 532 
the PEL model—although they employ additional methods, such as conceptual analysis.  533 
Consequently, the broad applicability of the PEL model supports the previously quoted AAAS 534 
position that many of the “fundamental values and aspects [of science] are also the province of 535 
the humanities,” as well as the NRC position that “there are other ways of knowing” besides 536 
science.  The extent of applications of the PEL model in the humanities depends (as always) on 537 
the availability of empirical, public, and adequate evidence for particular knowledge claims, 538 
which must be judged on a case-by-case basis.  The full benefit from empirical and public 539 
evidence arises from welcoming such evidence whether it occurs in the sciences or the 540 
humanities. 541 
Scientism also claims that philosophy of science and a radically naturalistic worldview 542 
support each other.  What is clear from the PEL model is that arguments for an alliance between 543 
science and any worldview have two options:  Worldview content may either enter the argument 544 
as a presupposition, or else exit the argument as a conclusion based on empirical and public 545 
evidence.  The first option has augmented presuppositions of the form, “The physical world is 546 
real and orderly and we humans find it substantially comprehensible, and worldview X is true.”  547 
Of course, whether an argument hinges on presuppositions or else evidence has consequences 548 
for the breadth of the audience that might be expected to find it interesting.  However, what is 549 
disallowed are circular arguments for a science-worldview alliance that have the same worldview 550 
content appear as both presupposition and conclusion because that constitutes empty 551 
reasoning.  Rather, what is easiest for an audience to consider and evaluate are precise 552 
arguments in which the logical role of the worldview content—as either presuppositions or 553 
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conclusions—is stated explicitly, clearly, and accurately.  Also, arguments that use evidence to 554 
draw conclusions will be most effective if they use logic that treats competing hypotheses or 555 
worldviews in an equal, unbiased, and symmetrical manner. 556 
The traditional view of science—as one way of knowing—has much to commend it.  “The 557 
method of natural science is not the sole and universal rational way of reaching truth; it is one 558 
version of rational method, applied to a particular set of truths” (p 134 in 29).  Likewise, 559 
“rationality should not simply be identified with it [science],” but rather “science itself stands in 560 
need of a rational underpinning” (p 5 in 30). 561 
 562 
Discussion 563 
Because position papers from the NRC, AAAS, and NSF have presented the mainstream 564 
perspective on science’s powers and limits without reasons based on science’s resources, their 565 
potential impact on the ongoing competition among diminished, mainstream, and aggrandized 566 
positions has been impaired.  What is the way forward?  My suggestion is to begin with an incisive 567 
question that is equally relevant and fair from all perspectives, namely this article’s first question:  568 
What are the requirements for full disclosure of all premises needed to support any scientific 569 
conclusion?  That is, do scientists have adequate resources to support conclusions about the 570 
physical world? 571 
 The PEL model recognizes three resources:  presuppositions, evidence, and logic.  572 
Contemporary scientists already have effective procedures and instruments to acquire data and 573 
evidence, and likewise powerful logic and mathematics (and computers) to analyze data and 574 
assess evidence—and year by year, they improve.  But this is only two-thirds of science’s required 575 
resources.  The underdeveloped third has been science’s presuppositions, which are 576 
indispensable.  Indeed, without an explicit account of presuppositions, it is absolutely and 577 
provably impossible to explain how science has any admissible evidence, to specify what science 578 
refers to or talks about, to defend science’s rationality, and to understand how science reaches 579 
any conclusions whatsoever.  Consequently, a strategic move for mainstream science would be 580 
to restore presuppositions to their proper and essential place in the science curriculum.  Only the 581 
complete resources of presuppositions, evidence, and logic can provide a reasoned account of 582 
science’s powers and limits that is balanced, responsible, and defensible. 583 
 584 
Conclusions 585 
Several key ideas capture the essence of this article.  Mainstream science’s position on the 586 
powers and limits of science, unlike its competitors’ positions, can be given an intellectually 587 
rigorous defense based on the resources of science, namely presuppositions, evidence, and logic, 588 
as specified by the PEL model.  Presuppositions and logic answer the question, “How can we 589 
assert any of the hypotheses?,” whereas evidence answers the question, “How can we assert a 590 
specific hypothesis rather than any of the others?”  A helpful way to assure the full and proper 591 
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influence of evidence is to handle the accompanying presuppositions and logic skillfully.  The 592 
current intellectual climate of vigorous debate about the powers and limits of science behooves 593 
proponents of mainstream science to present their position with reasons based on a viable 594 
account of the resources of science. 595 
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